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PERFORMANCE EFFECTS OF IMITATIVE ENTRY
SENDIL K. ETHIRAJ* and DAVID H. ZHU
Stephen M. Ross School of Business, University of Michigan, Ann Arbor, Michigan,
U.S.A.
This article examines how waiting to imitate a product affects the performance of the imitator
compared to the innovator. Specifically, we address two research questions. Under what con-
ditions does imitation erode the advantage of the innovator? What strategies of imitators help
overcome the innovator’s advantage? Our main argument is that the increasing availability of
information on the innovator’s product increases the imitator’s returns to waiting. With this
increasing availability of information, imitators’ products transition from those that are horizon-
tally differentiated (products are similar in quality but differ in their attributes) to those that are
vertically differentiated (products differ in quality). Thus, we hypothesize that shifts in the nature
of competition over time from horizontal differentiation to vertical differentiation account for
why the innovator’s advantage is not preserved. Imitation timing simply reflects the uncertainty
inherent in imitation efforts. One such uncertainty is the extent of product differentiation that
the imitator can achieve. We develop several hypotheses that elaborate this basic intuition. We
obtained detailed data on innovator-imitator competition in the branded drug industry to test the
hypotheses. All our hypotheses are supported. The main contribution of the article is in showing
that the nature of product differentiation in product categories is endogenous to the imitative
entry decisions of firms. Copyright  2008 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.
INTRODUCTION
How do firms generate and sustain superior
performance is arguably a central question in
the strategy research enterprise (Nelson, 1991;
Rumelt, Schendel, and Teece, 1994). A flip side
of this question is what deters imitation efforts
that preserve the competitive advantage of lead-
ing firms or under what conditions are imitation
efforts successful. In explaining imitation deter-
rence, the extant literature emphasizes two mech-
anisms: causal ambiguity or uncertainty around
the choices of superior performing firms (Barney,
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1986; Rumelt, 1984) and complexity and path
dependence that impedes piecemeal imitation
(Dierickx and Cool, 1989; Rivkin, 2000). A related
literature examines the conditions under which
early entry advantages are durable or why later
entrants (or imitators) never catch up. Though the
two literatures share similar concerns with under-
standing sources of durable performance differ-
ences, they have progressed along largely distinct
and independent trajectories. In this article, we
seek to exploit the common concerns of the two
literatures and in the process contribute both to
a better understanding of sources of early entry
advantages and the conditions under which imita-
tion is effective.
The literature on imitation may be usefully
decomposed into two related research questions:
why do firms imitate, and what are the performance
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effects of imitation. On the question of why firms
imitate, there is a large literature spanning strat-
egy, economics, and organization theory and an
attendant empirical literature (see Lieberman and
Asaba, 2006 for a comprehensive review). In con-
trast, the question of the performance effects of
imitation is much less studied. The explanations
for why imitation may be (un)successful are mostly
conceptual in nature (see Reed and DeFillippi,
1990 for a review) or based on computer simu-
lations (Ethiraj, Levinthal, and Roy, 2008; Rivkin,
2000). Little or no research has empirically exam-
ined what firms choose to imitate and how those
choices create performance consequences.
What explains entry timing advantages? Two
classes of theories agree on the prediction that
early entry is good but differ in their explana-
tion (see Golder and Tellis, 1993 for an excep-
tion). Explanations on the demand side argue that
consumer familiarity with the early entrant’s prod-
uct, uncertainty avoidance in trying later entrants’
products, choice of optimal locations in product
space by early entrants, or consumer switching
costs provide durable advantage to early entrants
(Greve, 2000; Schmalensee, 1982). This relation-
ship is particularly strong in markets with
horizontally differentiated products, that is, when
consumers choose products based on attribute pref-
erences rather than quality differences (Bohlman,
Golder, and Mitra, 2002). The supply-side theo-
ries argue that early entry matters since it provides
advantages of size (Klepper, 1996). Large firms
have a larger sales base over which their process
innovations can be utilized that in turn allows them
to lower costs in proportion to their sales. Later
entrants are smaller and thus continue to lag the
early entrants in cost competitiveness. This litera-
ture has a strong empirical tradition (see Lieber-
man and Montgomery, 1988; 1998 for a review).
However, the empirical findings have been mixed
with several studies finding no advantages to early
entry (see VanderWerf and Mahon, 1997 for a
meta-analysis).
The point of departure for this article is, on the
one hand, the lack of empirical research on the
imitation choices of firms and their performance
consequences and, on the other hand, inadequate
explanations for the inconsistent empirical findings
on the performance effects of entry timing. The
entry timing literature is mostly focused on identi-
fying industry characteristics that create early entry
advantages while largely ignoring the firm-specific
choices that determine entry timing decisions. In
short, the imitation literature is long on theory and
short on evidence and the converse is true for
the entry timing literature. We saw an opportu-
nity to unite both literatures to address these gaps.
In addressing them we ask two research questions.
Under what conditions does imitation erode the
advantage of the innovator? What strategies of imi-
tators help overcome the innovator’s advantage?
We enjoined our interest in these research ques-
tions with an empirical puzzle in the branded
drug industry. Cohen (2006) documented that the
innovator did not always enjoy a market share
advantage in new drug product categories. This is
surprising especially since theory predicts durable
innovator advantages in the pharmaceutical indus-
try because of strong patent protection and the
importance of complementary assets in the form
of sales forces (Cohen, Nelson, and Walsh, 2000;
Teece, 1986). In explaining this anomaly, we focus
on the imitation time lag between the innovator
and the imitator. We argue that when products are
horizontally differentiated (i.e., products differ in
their characteristics but are similar in quality) the
innovator’s advantages are relatively durable. In
contrast, when products are vertically differenti-
ated (i.e., products differ in quality) imitators enjoy
significant advantages. Thus, we hypothesized that
shifts in the nature of competition over time from
horizontal to vertical differentiation account for the
loss of the innovator’s advantage in the branded
drug industry. Greater imitation time lag is cor-
related with greater information about the inno-
vator’s drug that the imitator can use to exploit
vertical differentiation opportunities. In testing this
idea, we exploit another unique feature of the
branded drug industry wherein drug information
leaks gradually as the drug progresses through var-
ious stages of clinical trials (DiMasi, 1995). We
show that the success of imitators is linked to
the quality of information about the innovator’s
drug that is available for potential imitators. Thus,
our primary explanation for variance in innovator’s
advantage in the pharmaceutical industry revolves
around a transformation of competition over time
from one of horizontal differentiation to one of
vertical differentiation.
We would like to emphasize three main con-
tributions of this study. First, the literature on
entry timing distinguishes between timing advan-
tages within horizontally or vertically differenti-
ated products. It assumes that whether products are
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horizontally or vertically differentiated is exoge-
nous to the entry decisions of firms. In this arti-
cle, we endogenize the nature of differentiation in
products to imitators’ entry decisions. We argue
and show that it is the imitators’ entry decisions
that create horizontal or vertical differentiation in
product categories. Thus, an insight that our anal-
ysis affords is that the same product category can
transition from horizontal to vertical differentiation
depending on the imitation decisions of firms. Sec-
ond, we show that entry timing is perhaps simply
an artifact of the imitation decisions of firms that in
turn generate entry timing advantages or disadvan-
tages. Timing is important to the extent that imi-
tating firms have the requisite information about
the innovator’s product to generate horizontally
or vertically differentiated products. This affords
a theory of timing advantages rooted in manage-
rial decisions and, thus, contributes to increasing
the theoretical rigor of the entry timing literature.
Finally, with respect to the imitation literature, we
show how uncertainty and its progressive resolu-
tion over time create imitation advantages. More
important, this represents a first, albeit modest,
attempt at empirically examining imitation choices
and their performance consequences.
First, we briefly review the literature on entry
timing. We then draw on the imitation literature to
develop the principal theory and hypotheses and
follow that with our description of the research
context and the research methods respectively. We
then present the results and discussion respectively
and provide our conclusion
PRIOR LITERATURE
The literature on entry timing focuses on whether
timing has an impact on firm performance and
the theoretical basis for such differences. As sug-
gested earlier, the literature may be usefully par-
titioned into theories focusing on the supply side
and demand side respectively. We briefly review
both literatures.
Supply side: experience and entry timing
Klepper (1996) develops a simple model to explain
the importance of early entry into a new product
category. In his model, a firm introduces a prod-
uct innovation that induces a set of consumers to
buy its product. The product innovation advantage
is temporary and imitators costlessly imitate the
innovation with a lag. In parallel, the innovator is
also engaged in process innovation that reduces
average production cost. The returns to process
innovation are increasing in the sales volume or
market share of the firm. The imitator entering with
a one-period lag attracts a new set of consumers.
By implication, later entrants entering the market
with an identical offering will garner smaller and
smaller shares of the market. A smaller market
share also will leave the later entrants at a dis-
advantage vis-à-vis the innovator since the cost
advantage from process innovation is increasing in
market share. Thus, early entrants enjoy a durable
advantage against new entrants. The empirical evi-
dence is largely supportive of this model (Klepper,
2002).
It is useful to understand the effects of early
entry if we relax the two assumptions in Klep-
per (1996). The assumption of product innovation
being costlessly imitable is critical. It implies that
the incremental benefits of imitators’ products will
not cause existing customers to switch because
they are costlessly imitated by the innovators,
albeit with a lag. Thus, relaxing this assumption
can have two effects. One, if imitation is costly,
then the imitators are more likely to wait for bet-
ter information about the innovator’s product so
that they can improve upon it (Dasgupta, 1988).
Two, in the reverse cycle, if the imitators’ prod-
ucts are costly for the innovators to imitate, there is
an incentive for existing customers of the innova-
tors to switch to the imitators’ product. This would
undercut the innovator’s advantage.
With respect to the assumption of process inno-
vation, it is unlikely to provide an early entry
advantage if production cost is only a small pro-
portion of total cost (e.g., if research and devel-
opment [R&D] comprises a large portion of total
costs) Further, if product innovation is costly, then
firms may prefer to wait and watch rather than
race to the market since competition is based on
product quality that cannot be costlessly imitated.
Thus, relaxing the twin assumptions in Klepper’s
(1996) model suggests that the benefits of early
entry are contingent. For instance, in the branded
drug industry imitation is costly since imitators
also have to engage in independent clinical tri-
als. Similarly, process innovation has a negligi-
ble effect since production cost accounts for only
about 10–15 percent of the total cost of drugs
(Berndt et al., 1995).
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The current study is by no means the first one to
suggest that entry timing is a double-edged sword.
Lieberman and Montgomery (1988) outline four
factors that can create early mover disadvantages:
free rider, shifts in technology, shifts in customer
needs, and incumbent inertia (see also Golder and
Tellis, 1993). Our contribution to this literature is
twofold. First, much of the extant studies have
focused on cost-side asymmetries between early
and late entrants to draw entry timing implications.
Consequently, most of the tests of entry timing
effects are directed at the industry level where
the industry supplies the variance in costs (see
VanderWerf and Mahon, 1997 for a review and
critique). In contrast, we show that even when such
cost asymmetries within one industry are absent,
entry timing effects can still exist. Our second
contribution to this literature is in highlighting
the managerial decisions that underpin such entry
timing effects.
Demand side: early mover advantages
The early literature on entry timing effects argued
for a negative relationship between order of entry
into new markets and market share in horizontally
differentiated experience goods (see Schmalensee,
1982). In horizontally differentiated markets, prod-
ucts offer identical price-performance tradeoffs but
differ in the bundle of attributes (Eaton and Lipsey,
1998). These bundles of attributes appeal to differ-
ent groups of consumers and create imperfect sub-
stitution across products. Thus, consumer choice
is driven by individual preferences. For instance,
products such as video games, cereals, paper tow-
els, and razor blades are examples of experience
goods (i.e., product information is obtained only
after use) that are horizontally differentiated. The
first product in a category induces trial by con-
sumers. Once adoption occurs, consumers have
little incentive to switch to the products of later
entrants since there is little incremental benefit.
Furthermore, in experience goods, because of the
uncertainty associated with trying new products,
the absence of clear incremental benefit induces
consumers to stay with the first product. Sev-
eral empirical studies fit this theoretical prediction
(Huff and Robinson, 1994; Lee et al., 2000; Robin-
son and Fornell, 1985; Urban et al., 1986), though
several other studies have found no relationship
and sometimes a positive relationship (see Golder
and Tellis, 1993; VanderWerf and Mahon, 1997 for
a summary).
The obvious question is whether the relation-
ship between order of entry and market share
is robust to the relaxation of the two boundary
conditions of horizontal differentiation and experi-
ence goods. In the case of vertically differentiated
products, there are clear differences in the price-
performance tradeoff offered, that is, higher price
is associated with higher performance or quality
(Eaton and Lipsey, 1998). If quality is observ-
able, ceteris paribus, consumers always prefer the
highest-quality product. Thus, consumer choice is
independent of individual preferences. Examples
of vertically differentiated products include wrist-
watches (Rolex to Swatch), automobiles (Cadillac
to Saturn), and cameras (Hasselblad to Kodak). In
vertically differentiated markets, if later entrants
offer superior price-performance tradeoffs then
consumers have an incentive to switch. This incen-
tive to switch, however, is dampened if the product
is an experience good because the higher quality
is unknown. Conversely, the incentive to switch is
amplified if the product is a search good (i.e., infor-
mation on product characteristics can be obtained
prior to purchase and/or use). In other words, if
later entrants offer superior quality products (ver-
tical differentiation) and such quality differences
are discernible prior to purchase then the advan-
tage of early entry is fragile. For instance, in a
recent paper, Bohlman et al. (2002) find that pio-
neers do worse than later entrants in product cat-
egories where quality (vertical differentiation) is
more important than variety (horizontal differenti-
ation).
In sum, much of the extant literature has tended
to view products either as horizontally differen-
tiated or vertically differentiated and rarely exam-
ined transitions from one to the other. Such
transitions can have important implications for
early entry advantages for firms within a single
industry. Moreover, understanding how and why
transitions in the nature of differentiation occur
will help better understand the managerial deci-
sion processes that generate or dampen early entry
advantages. This article seeks to address these
issues.
THEORY AND HYPOTHESES
Entry timing and imitation benefits
The challenge of imitation and its consequences
become interesting only in the presence of uncer-
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tainty (Lieberman and Asaba, 2006). Consider, for
instance, a firm choosing between an internally
generated product development project and one
that imitates a competitor’s product. Only when
the costs and benefits of each project is uncertain
will the decision become nonobvious and also
present the possibility of observing variation in
choices. In general, imitation under uncertainty
presents a simple tradeoff (Dasgupta, 1988). If a
firm chooses to imitate in the early stages when
uncertainty is high, the imitator is subject to the
same uncertainties that the innovator faces, which
increases the riskiness of the project. The benefit to
the imitator, however, is that eventual leadership in
the market is highly contested since the innovator
does not enjoy a significant monopoly presence in
the market that will enable it to erect entry barriers
or raise the cost of competition for later entrants
such as through patents, exclusive contracts, or
spatial saturation (Lieberman and Montgomery,
1988). In contrast, if the imitator chooses to wait
until the uncertainty clears, it reduces the riskiness
of the investment but also gives the innovator
enough time to erect entry barriers and raise the
cost of competition for the imitator. It is useful to
probe more carefully how this tradeoff affects the
nature and quality of products that emerge from
imitation.
Consider the contemporary automotive indus-
try. We have two different technologies with dif-
ferent levels of uncertainty competing with the
established internal combustion engine—the gas-
electric hybrid and fuel cells. The gas-electric
hybrid technology pioneered by Toyota presents
much less technical uncertainty to a potential imi-
tator but all the post-entry downsides outlined
above. Information about the cost and features of
the technology is relatively well known as are the
attributes desired by customers. In contrast, the
fuel cell technology pursued by General Motors
presents much greater uncertainty. Both the costs
and technical challenges of the technology are
unknown, as are the market preferences and the
complementary assets required for commercializa-
tion (e.g., hydrogen filling stations). What are the
implications of choosing the gas-electric or the fuel
cell for a potential imitator (e.g., Ford)?
Looking at Toyota’s gas-electric hybrid, an imi-
tator faces two choices for imitation. It can choose
to horizontally differentiate the product by chang-
ing the design of the car (e.g., offering a station
wagon) but maintain parity in quality (e.g., fuel
efficiency, acceleration) or choose to vertically dif-
ferentiate via significant improvements on the prin-
cipal quality dimensions on which the gas-electric
hybrid is evaluated. There are obvious cost-benefit
tradeoffs for either choice. The horizontal differ-
entiation option clearly demands less R&D dollars
and lower risk in comparison with the vertical
differentiation option. However, the tradeoff is in
the market potential. The horizontal differentiation
option runs up against an established incumbent,
and market prospects are unlikely to be signifi-
cantly superior to that of Toyota. The converse is
true for the vertical differentiation option. Improv-
ing the principal dimensions of quality is likely
to demand much greater R&D investments and
entail greater uncertainty in cost, time, and likeli-
hood of success. However, the benefit to this larger
investment is higher in that it presents consumers
with a clearly superior product in comparison with
the product of the established incumbent. Thus,
with greater availability of information about the
innovator’s product, the option to pursue vertical
differentiation becomes a real possibility. To the
extent that the imitator chooses to pursue vertical
differentiation, other things held constant, it has a
higher likelihood of outperforming the innovator.
The imitator’s options in the case of fuel cells
are more constrained. There is much greater uncer-
tainty about the technology and the cost of various
choices, as is the market’s preferences about the
resulting product. The imitator can, at best, glean
sketchy information about the path being pursued
by the innovator and pursue a similar path. Con-
sequently, the imitator is subject to more or less
the same kinds of uncertainties that the innovator
faces. The imitator, therefore, is unlikely to be able
to use information from the innovator’s develop-
ment effort to develop a superior product. Given
the differences in the choices available to the imi-
tator in the gas-electric hybrid versus the fuel cell
option, we surmise that the imitator is more likely
to come up with a horizontally differentiated prod-
uct in the fuel cell case.
Stepping back from the examples, it is now pos-
sible to develop a simple theory relating imitation
timing and the returns to imitation. Imitation is
most useful in the face of uncertainty (Lieber-
man and Asaba, 2006). Imitation reduces costs for
the imitator by helping update the beliefs of the
imitator using information from the innovator or
improving estimates of expected costs and benefits
of pursuing a course of action (Cyert and March,
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1963). At high levels of uncertainty, the quality of
information about the innovator’s product is poor
and any possibility of using that information to
develop a superior product is relatively limited.
In contrast, when uncertainty is lower, the quality
of information is greater, and this can be used to
develop a superior imitative product. Thus, uncer-
tainty about the imitator’s product characteristics
affects the imitator’s opportunities for differentia-
tion. In other words, greater uncertainty about the
innovator’s product is more likely to result in a
horizontally differentiated imitative product, and
lower uncertainty is more likely to lead to a verti-
cally differentiated imitative product. If imitation
timing is a proxy for the underlying uncertainty
about the imitator’s product, we might conjecture
that the later the imitation timing, the greater the
likelihood of a vertically differentiated imitator’s
product.
The nature of product differentiation affects the
returns to imitation (Pepall, 1997). The tradeoff
is again between the cost of differentiation and
market competition. Horizontal differentiation con-
sumes less R&D dollars since the imitative product
is largely similar to the innovator’s product. The
lower cost of incremental change to achieve hori-
zontal differentiation is traded off against the cost
of market competition. Such costs might involve
short-term outlays such as advertising or providing
free samples to induce trials. It also might involve
long-term costs such as price discounting to build
market share. In either case, the cost of competi-
tion for the imitator should be weighed against the
lower cost of horizontal differentiation. In contrast,
vertical differentiation consumes more R&D dol-
lars. The upside on the market, however, is that the
superior quality makes it easier to induce consumer
trial and also opens up the possibility of a price
premium vis-à-vis the innovator. Thus, the nature
of product differentiation affects the ultimate suc-
cess of the imitator in the market. Other things held
constant, vertically differentiated imitative prod-
ucts have a higher likelihood of outperforming the
innovator’s product in the market.
Having linked uncertainty and imitation tim-
ing to product differentiation opportunities and
then product differentiation to returns from imi-
tation, it is now possible to connect all three.
Over time, there is greater information about the
innovator’s product available to potential imita-
tors (Abernathy and Utterback, 1978; Tushman
and Anderson, 1986). The greater availability of
information reduces uncertainty and increases the
opportunities for vertical differentiation among
imitators. Again, if imitation timing is a proxy
for uncertainty about the innovator’s product, over
time, with increased availability of information,
the opportunity for imitation changes from hor-
izontal differentiation to vertical differentiation.
This change in turn affects the returns to imita-
tion. Thus, products of later imitative entrants are
more likely to outperform the innovator’s product.
This sums up our theory relating imitation timing,
nature of product differentiation, and the returns to
imitative entry. Thus, we hypothesize that, ceteris
paribus:
Hypothesis 1: The greater the imitation time
lag between the innovator’s product and the
imitator’s product, the greater the likelihood
that the imitator will beat the innovator in sales.
Information leakage, opportunities for
differentiation, and returns to imitation
In Hypothesis 1 we argued that with the passage
of time greater information about the innovator’s
product becomes available. Such information can
form the basis for potential imitators to transform
the product category into a vertically differenti-
ated one. If this is true, we should observe the
direct impact of differentiation on the likelihood of
beating the innovator. Thus, we hypothesize that,
ceteris paribus,
Hypothesis 2: The greater the vertical differen-
tiation of the imitator’s product relative to the
innovator’s product, the greater the likelihood
that the imitator will beat the innovator in sales.
Differentiation, the information leakage
trajectory, and imitation benefits
In Hypothesis 1 we argued that a change in the
quality of information over time alters the uncer-
tainty associated with imitation. The changing
uncertainty in turn presents different opportunities
for differentiation and affects the outcome of imita-
tion. This led to the first hypothesis that the greater
the imitation time lag between the introduction of
the innovator’s drug and the imitator’s drug, the
more likely the imitator will beat the innovator
in the market. If more information allows imi-
tators to engage in better product differentiation,
Copyright  2008 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. Strat. Mgmt. J., 29: 797–817 (2008)
DOI: 10.1002/smj
Performance Effects of Imitative Entry 803
then we should directly observe the returns to dif-
ferentiation. This led to Hypothesis 2 where we
argued that vertically differentiated products are
more likely to beat the innovator. Finally, if prod-
uct differentiation accounts for the positive slope
between imitation time lag and the likelihood of
beating the innovator, we expect that the positive
slope should be dampened when product differen-
tiation is accounted for. In other words, we expect
product differentiation to mediate the relationship
between imitation time lag and the likelihood of
beating the innovator. Thus, we hypothesize that,
Hypothesis 3: Product differentiation will medi-
ate the relationship between entry timing and the
likelihood of beating the innovator.
RESEARCH CONTEXT: THE BRANDED
DRUG INDUSTRY
The branded drug industry provides a unique con-
text to study firm-level differences in the returns
to early entry. Product development in the branded
drug industry usually comprises two stages: drug
discovery and drug development. See Appendix
for a description.
We chose the branded drug industry to test
our hypotheses for four reasons. First, in order
to study imitation efforts across firms, we needed
to identify product categories within which prod-
ucts are largely substitutes (albeit, imperfect) for
one another. Following Lu and Comanor (1998),
we defined product categories in drugs by targets
or mechanisms of action. A drug target is a pro-
tein, cell, or human organ that is affected by or
is a cause of disease. Drugs that act on a sin-
gle target via a mechanism of action constitute a
reasonably well-defined product category because
drugs within the group are close substitutes of one
another (Lu and Comanor, 1998). This enabled us
to identify clear product categories within which
we could examine innovator-imitator dynamics.
We defined the first drug in a mechanism of action
as innovator and all subsequent entrants as imi-
tators. More generally, the terms innovator and
imitator span a continuum. Anchoring one end of
the continuum, a pure imitator is one that com-
pletely copies an innovator and produces an iden-
tical product. All the information and knowledge
that goes into making the imitative product comes
from the innovator. Generic drugs are an exam-
ple of such pure-type imitation. A pure innovator
is one whose product is based on the innovator’s
own knowledge and information since there are no
substitute products available. In between these two
ends lie a range of imitative behaviors that draw
greater or lesser information from the innovator.
Thus, the notion of imitation employed in this arti-
cle refers to the imitators or later entrants using
information from the innovator to guide their imi-
tation decisions. This is consistent with equating
informational spillovers with imitation (see Das-
gupta, 1988: 74–75).
Second, in order to track information and knowl-
edge spillovers between firms, we needed products
or product categories where there is significant
uncertainty about the technical characteristics of
the product and the market preferences for those
characteristics. When imitation is costly and there
is uncertainty about product characteristics and
market preferences, the imitation decision is far
from straightforward. In other words, neither the
‘race to imitate’ nor the ‘wait and watch’ strate-
gies are optimal strategies for all firms. This will
generate variance in the behavior of imitators on
their imitation timing. Without variance in imita-
tion timing we cannot test any of our hypotheses.
Third, we needed to observe leakage or spillover
of information about the innovator’s product over
time. The regulatory review process of drug devel-
opment (see Appendix) and the long timelines
involved enabled relatively accurate inferences
about the quality of information about the inno-
vator’s drug leaking at different time points. The
run-up to R&D and eventual Food and Drug
Administration (FDA) approval of the drug is
highly uncertain. New targets or mechanisms of
action represent new science, and it is incumbent
upon the innovating firm to convince the scien-
tific community that the new target is based on
research that meets the rigors of science (Polidoro,
2006). This often involves publishing the details of
the scientific breakthrough in prestigious journals
such as JAMA (Journal of the American Medical
Association), Nature, or New England Journal of
Medicine. This provides the basis for observing
information leakage. Without a clear information
transmission mechanism it is difficult to connect
imitation timing outcomes to information leakage
about the innovator’s product. In addition, we can
map the quality of information leakage to different
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phases of the clinical trial process. At the conclu-
sion of phase I clinical trials, the only information
available is whether or not the drug is safe for
use with humans. There is little or no information
on the characteristics of the drug or its effective-
ness in disease treatment. So any imitation based
on this information should result only in horizontal
differentiation. In contrast, the conclusion of phase
II clinical trials reveals information about the effi-
cacy of the drug and its characteristics. Imitation
based on this information affords vertical differen-
tiation. Thus, being able to assess the quality of
information leakage over time made the branded
drug industry an attractive setting for this study.
Finally, we needed to measure the characteristics
of products to distinguish between horizontal and
vertical differentiation. Prior studies in this area
have simply used different product categories to
capture horizontal or vertical differentiation using
a dummy variable. Having chosen product cate-
gories within which products are close substitutes,
it was important for us to be able to measure
product characteristics that made them horizon-
tally or vertically differentiated. Product differen-
tiation in the branded drug industry is along two
dimensions: efficacy and safety (Yeoh and Roth,
1999). Whereas efficacy is seen from the number
and nature of treatment indications for which the
drug is approved, safety is seen from the number
and nature of side effects that the drug engenders
(Berndt et al., 1995). Using these two dimensions,
it is possible to characterize horizontal and verti-
cal differentiation. Consider two cholesterol drugs
A and B that are horizontally differentiated. Drug
A reduces cholesterol in about four weeks and
has side effects that include headache and nausea.
Drug B reduces cholesterol in about four weeks
and causes headache and drowsiness. If the two
drugs are identically priced, consumers will choose
drug A or B depending on their preferences for
nausea or drowsiness. In contrast, the two drugs
are vertically differentiated if the number of indi-
cations and side effects, respectively, are signif-
icantly different. For instance, if drug A lowers
only LDL cholesterol and drug B both lowers LDL
cholesterol and increases HDL cholesterol, then
the two drugs are vertically differentiated. Simi-
larly, if drug A causes headache and nausea and
drug B cause headache, nausea, drowsiness, and
stomach pains, then quality differences between
the two drugs become more apparent. Holding
price constant, consumers are always expected to
choose drug A over drug B.
These four reasons made the branded drug
industry an attractive setting to test the hypotheses
presented earlier. The following section outlines
the empirical methodology that we employed.
METHODS
Sample and data
The data for the sample was compiled from mul-
tiple sources. We first obtained the full list of
therapeutic classes and mechanisms of action for
existing branded drugs from Mosby’s Rx, and Drug
Facts and Comparisons, two major physicians’ ref-
erence directories of drug information. We used
each mechanism of action to identify a distinct
product category.1
We then obtained drug sales ranks from Med
Ad News, a trade journal that tracks the phar-
maceutical and biotech industries. For the period
1994–2004, we obtained an annual list of the top
200 drugs by sales revenue in the global market.
This source did not compile drug sales information
prior to this period. The top-selling drug in any
year was Lipitor with sales revenues of $11,594M
in 2004. The lowest-selling drug in the top-200
list in any year was Alesse with sales revenues
of $20M in 1997. This wide range of dollar sales
volumes indicates that branded drugs with even
modest sales were captured in our dataset.
We then matched this list of drugs to a list of
all drugs approved by the FDA and listed in the
Orange Book.2 The Orange Book yielded data on
FDA approval dates, names of firms that received
drug approval, drug therapeutic characteristics, and
patents that protect the drug from generic compe-
tition.3
1 We did not include biological drugs or generic drugs in the
sample. The information leakage in biological drugs over the
phases of clinical trials is not comparable with small molecule
drugs, which complicates comparisons. We also excluded generic
drugs since they are identical to their branded drug counterparts
(i.e., not differentiated). The list of targets that was included in
the study is available from the authors.
2 The publication, Approved Drug Products with Therapeutic
Equivalence Evaluations (commonly known as the Orange
Book), identifies drug products approved by the FDA on the
basis of safety and effectiveness under the Federal Food, Drug,
and Cosmetic Act.
3 Of the 309 drugs for which we had sales rank data, 54 drugs
had two corresponding ‘trade names’ in the Orange Book. For
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We collected data on the indications and side
effects for all drugs in the sample from three inde-
pendent sources: Mosby’s Rx, Micromedex, and
Efacts. All three databases are physician refer-
ence sources that list important drug characteristics
such as approved indications, known side effects,
dosage, and package labeling. We extracted the
indications and side effects respectively for each
drug. We purchased data on drug level detail-
ing expenditures from Verispan.4 The detailing
data (for the United States) spanned the period
1991–2004 for the top-500 drugs by dollar sales
revenues. Firm-specific data such as sales, R&D
expenditures, employees, and assets were compiled
from the Compustat database.
Identifying the innovators and imitators involved
mapping drugs to dates. This could be done in two
ways: (1) identify the date of FDA approval of
each drug; (2) identify the date of commencement
of drug development for each drug. Ideally, the
study demands the identification of dates that cor-
respond to the start of drug development. Unfor-
tunately, this date was difficult to identify, so we
used the FDA approval date to identify innovators
and imitators. We attempted to collect patent list-
ing information for all drugs in the sample. Since
patent filing constitutes the first identifiable date
for commencement of a drug development pro-
gram, it provides a good approximation for when
drug development effort began.5
The patent listing information is provided in
the Orange Book released by the FDA each year.
The listing of drug patents in the Orange Book is
mandated by the Hatch-Waxman Act of 1984 that
regulates generic drug competition. We collected
all the Orange Books published since 1984 and
example, AVIANE corresponds to AVIANE-21 and AVIANE-
28 in the Orange Book. Twenty other drugs correspond to more
than two ‘trade names’ in the Orange Book. We merged all such
variants into a single drug in order to obtain a match with the
sales rank data. We also found that some drugs were issued to
subsidiaries of a company. We used Hoover’s Online and Who
Owns Whom to identify the parent companies. We also referred
to Compustat, Hoover’s Online, and company annual reports to
identify any mergers or acquisitions among our sample firms. We
treat firms as separate entities before a merger or acquisition.
4 Verispan, a healthcare information company, is the leading
provider of de-identified patient-centric, longitudinal data.
5 We did not adopt patent dates as the primary identification
procedure because we found that several drugs in our final
sample did not have patents associated with them. This made
it difficult to precisely identify the date of commencement of
drug development. Hence we retained drug approval dates as
a proxy for the innovator and imitator respectively and did the
patent-based analysis as a robustness check.
compiled the patent listing information for all the
drugs in our sample.6
Our final sample comprised 171 drugs in 14 ther-
apeutic classes across 32 mechanisms of action.
This included 912 observations spanning the sales




Beat innovator. For each year we ranked all drugs
within a product class (i.e., mechanism of action)
by sales revenues. Each imitator drug for each year
was coded zero if its sales rank was lower than
that of the innovator and coded one if its sales rank
was higher. In all cases, when the imitator beat the
innovator, it also became the market share leader
in the product class.
Explanatory variables
Imitation lag. Imitation time lag was measured
as the time difference in years between the FDA
approval date of the innovator drug and the
approval date of the imitator drug. Consistent with
Hypothesis 1, we expect the sign on this coefficient
to be positive.
Product differentiation. Product differentiation
was measured using two variables—indications
and side effects respectively offered by the imi-
tator’s product in comparison with the innovator.
Difference in indications. For each imitator drug,
let NewInd be the indications offered by the imi-
tator drug but not the innovator drug, RedInd be
6 We identified the patent application dates for all the drugs in our
sample to map correspondence between first to FDA approval
and first to commence development. We found that many drugs
did not have corresponding patents. For 149 of the 171 drugs that
had patents associated with them, the innovator defined by FDA
approval date also matched the innovator by patent application
date, i.e., 87 percent of the sample was unaffected. Of the 22
drugs (11 pairs) whose status as innovators or imitators were
affected, we found that three pairs of drugs had less than one year
difference in patent application dates, another three pairs had a
difference of less than two years, and the remaining five pairs had
an average difference of seven years. Our hypotheses tests may
be confounded if the last group of five pairs of drugs is driving
the results. So for robustness we reran all the analyses by altering
the classification of the innovator and the imitator in our final
sample whenever applicable. The results were unchanged. This
gave us confidence that our approach to classifying innovators
and imitators does not account for the results.
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the indications offered by the innovator drug but
not the imitator drug, and InnTotInd be the total
number of indications offered by the innovator
drug. Difference in indications was measured as
(NewInd-RedInd)/InnTotInd. We expect the sign on
this coefficient to be positive.
Difference in side effects. For each imitator drug,
let NewSE be the side effects engendered by the
imitator drug but not the innovator drug, RedSE
be the side effects in the innovator drug but
not the imitator drug, and InnTotSE be the total
number of side effects in the innovator drug. Dif-
ference in side effects was measured as (NewSE-
RedSE)/InnTotSE. We expect the sign on this
coefficient to be negative.
Control variables
We included a variety of controls that are described
in Table 1. The controls may be subsumed into
imitator characteristics (size, detailing, R&D capa-
bilities, non-U.S. sales dummy), innovator char-
acteristics (innovator patent protection, innovator
beat itself, pre-1984 approval of innovator drug),
competition (entry order, coefficient of variation in
indications and side effects, respectively), market
size (therapeutic class dummies), and time-specific
effects (sales year dummies).
Model specification and estimation
We estimated a probit choice model of the like-
lihood that an imitator will beat the innovator
in a drug class in sales in any given year. We
included three sets of predictors—imitation time
lag, product differentiation, and other controls to
account for alternative explanations. Thus, the pro-
bit equation was,
P(zijt = 1) = αt + τj + βmij + δpdij
+ γ cij + ui (1)
where, zijt , denotes imitator drug i beating the
innovator in drug class j in sales year t , mij
is the imitation time lag between approval of
the innovator’s drug in drug class j and the
approval of the imitator drug i in the same drug
class j , pdij is a vector of product differentia-
tion covariates, cij is a vector of other controls,
αt the sales year dummies, τj the therapeutic class
dummies, and ui ∼ N(0, 1) the error term. Since
firms could be imitators on multiple drugs across
different drug classes, we report robust standard
errors.
RESULTS
Table 2 presents the descriptive statistics and cor-
relation matrix of variables employed in the regres-
sion estimation. About one-fourth of the imitators
across the 32 new drug classes beat the innova-
tor in the class. The average timing lag between
the entry of the innovator and the imitator was
6.8 years. The correlations were all in the expected
direction.7 Figure 1 presents the mean ratio of indi-
cations and side effects respectively for imitator
drugs that beat the innovator and those that did
not. The graph confirms our basic hypothesis that
differentiation in imitator drugs accounts for dif-
ferences in whether imitators beat the innovator.
Table 3 presents a series of nested probit regres-
sion estimates of the likelihood that an imitator
beats the innovator. Model 1 presents the results
of a specification that includes only the con-
trol variables. All signs on the controls were in
the expected direction. Larger firms were more
likely to beat the innovator. Consistent with prior
research, later entrants were less likely to beat
the innovator (Robinson and Fornell, 1985; Urban
et al., 1986). This is because multiple entries frag-
























Did not beat the innovator Beat the innovator
Indications Side effects
Figure 1. Differentiation of imitator drugs
7 The correlation between entry order and imitation lag is 0.71.
A correlation of this magnitude inflates the standard errors
in our coefficients and thus biases our hypotheses tests to be
conservative (Chatterjee, Hadi, and Price, 2000).
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Table 1. Description of control variables
Variables Measurement details Notes
Beat innovator U.S. 0, if the imitator’s U.S. drug sales were
smaller than that of the innovator’s U.S.
drug sales in a given year; 1 if the
imitator’s drug sales were larger
Alternative DV to assess robustness
Difference in drug sales Global sales of imitator’s drug minus global
sales of innovator’s drug (in $million)
Alternative DV to assess robustness
Indication ratio Number of indications of a drug divided by
the total number of indications offered by
all existing drugs in a given market-year
Used to construct variable ‘variance in
indications’
Side effect ratio Number of side effects of a drug divided by
the total number of side effects reported
by all existing drugs in a given
market-year
Used to construct variable ‘variance in
side effects’
Variance in indications SD(indication ratio)
Mean(indication ratio)
× N2(N − 1) Captures competition in drug quality (on
indications) among all drugs in a
given mechanism of action. Based on
the Gini coefficient (see Theil, 1967)
Variance in side effects SD(sideeff ect ratio)
Mean(sideeff ect ratio)
× N2(N − 1) Captures competition in drug quality (on
side effects) among all drugs in a
given mechanism of action. Based on
the Gini coefficient (see Theil, 1967)
Non-U.S. sales dummy Dummy variable. Equals 1 if the drug has
over 10% sales outside the U.S.
Account for market share differences
due to cross-country differences in
revenues
Imitator R&D intensity Imitator firm’s R&D expenditure divided by
total sales
Included in regression of differentiation
on imitation lag
Patents Moving three year sum of patents filed by
the firm in the corresponding therapeutic
class
Included in regression of differentiation
on imitation lag
Publications Moving three year sum of scientific
publications of the firm
Included in regression of differentiation
on imitation lag
Detailing (000s) Annual detailing expenditures on the
imitator drug ($thousand)
Measuring marketing differentiation
Log(sales) Log of contemporaneous firm sales for the
imitator
Measuring firm size differences
Entry order Time based rank ordering of FDA approval
time
Measuring entry order and competition
effects
Innovator patent protection Remaining patent protection years for the
innovator
Measuring patent protection of the leader
drug
Innovator beat itself Dummy variable. Equals 1 if the same firm
produced an imitator drug that beat its
own innovator drug in sales
Capturing cases where innovator
launched a new drug that beat its own
drug
Pre-1984 innovator Dummy variable equals 1 if the innovator
drug was approved before 1984
Captures effect of drug approval in the
pre-Hatch-Waxman Act era
Sales year dummies Sales year dummies Time-specific effects
Therapeutic class dummies Therapeutic class dummies Control variable, capturing market size
differences
likelihood that the later entrants will beat the inno-
vator. We also find that the greater the remaining
patent life of the innovator’s drug, the lower the
likelihood that the imitator will beat the innova-
tor. This is because the innovator’s incentive to
defend market share via detailing and advertising
is increasing in the remaining useful patent life on
the drug. Finally, we found a positive likelihood
that an innovator will beat itself though it was not
statistically significant.
Model 2 includes imitation time lag. The coef-
ficient on imitation time lag is positive and statis-
tically significant. All other variables held at their
means, one additional year increase in the imitation
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Table 2. Descriptive statistics and correlation matrix of variables employed in estimation (N = 912)
Variable name Mean SD 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
1 Beat innovator 0.25 0.44 1
2 Imitation Lag 6.84 4.69 −0.138 1
3 Difference in
indications
0.27 1.08 0.194 0.087 1
4 Difference in side
effects
1.08 7.27 −0.054 0.067 −0.032 1
5 Detaling (000s) 9.81 24.72 0.238 −0.020 0.091 −0.029 1
6 Log(Sales) 8.93 1.83 0.231 −0.155 0.018 0.089 0.142 1
7 Entry order 5.67 4.09 −0.160 0.717 0.065 −0.097 −0.153 −0.143 1
8 Variance in
indications
0.32 0.20 0.008 0.208 0.188 −0.022 0.006 −0.245 0.288 1
9 Variance in side
effects
0.34 0.24 −0.097 0.118 −0.036 0.154 −0.107 −0.204 −0.050 −0.037 1
10 Innovator patent
protection










Note: Correlations greater than 0.06 are significant at the .05 level or less.
time lag beyond the mean increases the probabil-
ity of beating the innovator by about 1.4 percent.
This provides baseline support for Hypothesis 1.
Models 3 and 4, respectively, include the product
differentiation variables. Model 5 presents the full
model. The sign on the coefficients of the controls
were all in the expected direction. We find that
the difference in the number of indications is posi-
tive and statistically significant. All other variables
held at their means, one percentage point increase
in the number of unique indications offered by the
imitator drug beyond the mean increases the prob-
ability of beating the innovator by 7.1 percent. The
coefficient on difference in side effects is negative
and statistically significant. All other variables held
at their means, one percentage point increase in the
number of unique side effects in the imitator drug
beyond the mean decreases the probability of beat-
ing the innovator by 0.6 percent. Figures 2 and 3
plot the marginal effects of the two differentiation
variables on the probability of beating the inno-
vator. Each figure plots three lines. One sets all
other variables in the regression at the mean in
the dataset, the second sets the other variables at
their minimum, and the last sets the other vari-
ables at their maximum. These graphs show how
the impact of differentiation varies over the range
of observed data. As can be seen, the impact of
indications is robust in the full range of observed
data. In contrast, the impact of side effects is some-
what weaker since its effect depends on the range
of the other variables in the regression equation.
Taken together this provides strong support for
Hypothesis 2.
Hypothesis 1 argued that increasing informa-
tion about the innovator’s drug that is available
over time allows imitators to vertically differenti-
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Figure 2. Marginal impact of indications
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Figure 3. Marginal impact of side effects
as products are horizontally differentiated the like-
lihood of beating the innovator is no better than
random, we expect the regression line for imita-
tion time lag to be flat (i.e., parallel to the x-axis)
until there is enough information about the inno-
vator drug to afford vertical differentiation. From
this point on we expect the slope to turn positive.
This relationship cannot be teased out from the
imitation lag variable. In order to identify whether
the pattern was indeed as we expected, we split
the sample into two: imitation time lag was seven
years or less and greater than seven years respec-
tively. This marks the conclusion of phase II clini-
cal trials when the quality of information about the
innovator’s drug allows imitators to pursue verti-
cal differentiation (DiMasi, 2001a). Models 6–9
present the results of the split sample regressions.
Model 6 presents estimates for the sample when
imitation lag is seven years or less. As expected,
imitation lag is nonsignificant. In contrast, when
imitation lag is greater than seven years (Model 7),
it is positive and statistically significant. This sup-
ports our argument that the quality of information
leakage after phase II clinical trials allows vertical
differentiation. Models 8 and 9 include the product
differentiation variables to the two subsamples and
they continue to be significant. This lends further
support to the theory underpinning Hypothesis 2.
Finally, turning to the mediation hypothesis,
the results were supportive. In Model 5, adding
the product differentiation variables causes the
imitation time lag coefficient to turn nonsignifi-
cant. This suggests complete mediation of imita-
tion lag. We also regressed indications and side
effects on imitation lag.8 Models I–J in Table 4
present the results of firm fixed-effect regres-
sions and Models K–L the random-effect regres-
sions. We included two measures of capabilities
(count of firm patents in the therapeutic class and
count of firm-scientific publications) to account
for the fact that the availability of information
is not sufficient for a firm to be able to exploit
it. The requisite absorptive capacity is a nec-
essary condition (Cohen and Levinthal, 1990).
Though the coefficients on both variables are in
the expected direction, they are statistically non-
significant. We conjecture that the nonsignificance
is due to measurement error in the two vari-
ables, that is, they do not precisely measure the
capabilities specific to the drug being imitated.
Consistent with prior research, in the absence
of good measures rooted in the context, we are
unlikely to discern the importance of capabili-
ties (Ethiraj, Kale, Krishnan, and Singh, 2005).
As expected, imitation lag is positive and signif-
icant in the case of indications and negative in
the case of side effects in both fixed-effect and
random-effect models. The causal test for media-
tion outlined in Baron and Kenny (1986) was com-
pletely met: (1) imitation time lag is statistically
significant in the absence of the differentiation
variables (Model 2); (2) regression of the differ-
entiation variables on imitation time lag yielded
statistically significant coefficients for both indi-
cations and side effects (p < 0.000) suggesting
that these two variables are the primary drivers
of mediation; (3) the differentiation variables are
statistically significant; and (4) imitation time lag
turns nonsignificant when the differentiation vari-
ables were added to the equation. This suggests
that the differentiation variables completely medi-
ate the relationship between imitation time lag and
the likelihood of beating the innovator (MacKin-
non et al., 2002). Thus, we found strong support
for Hypothesis 3.
8 Regressing indications and side effects on imitation lag implies
that indications and side effects are endogenous to the system.
To alleviate such concerns of endogeneity, we estimated a
three-stage least squares model with three equations. The first
two equations were Models I and J in Table 4. These two
equations were identified with R&D intensity, firm patents in
the therapeutic class, firm publications, and the approval year
dummies. The third equation was Model B in Table 4. The
results were robust in this specification as well. This alleviates
concerns about the endogeneity between imitation time lag and
the product differentiation measures. These results are available
from the authors.
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Robustness tests
We performed a variety of robustness tests to
establish confidence in the results. Table 4 presents
the alternative specifications. Columns A and B
present the results of a firm fixed-effects regression
using a continuous dependent variable (imitator
drug sales in dollars minus innovator drug sales
in dollars).9 The results are qualitatively similar
to the probit results presented earlier. Columns C
and D present the same results using firm random
effects. Since the dependent variable is annual drug
sales, there is the possibility of serial correlation.
To account for this, we estimated generalized least
squares models with a correction for drug panel
heteroskedasticity. These models are presented in
Columns E and F. We estimated the same models
allowing for correlations within drug panels. These
results are presented in Columns G and H. Once
again the results are consistent across all these
variants, giving us confidence that the results are
robust.
Finally, we reran all the models using patent
filing dates to construct the imitation time lag
variable to ensure that the unobserved factors that
affect market launch dates were not driving the
results. All the results were qualitatively similar to
that in Table 3. Also, to ensure that the results are
not simply a function of the estimation method,
we reran all models using logit estimation. All the
results were again largely similar to that in Table 3.
DISCUSSION
The primary objective of this study was to employ
a theory of information-based imitation to explain
the inconsistent empirical findings on the relation-
ship between entry timing and the performance
of imitators. In addressing this question, we saw
an opportunity to resolve an empirical puzzle in
the branded drug industry where an innovator’s
advantage was not always durable. In contrast
with the existing literature, we put forward a
positive relationship between imitation time lag
9 We did not use difference in sales revenues as the primary
specification for three reasons: (1) we had to make assumptions
about sales revenues when data was unavailable, (2) using sales
revenues entails demand estimation via a system of simultaneous
equations, which is challenging in the pharmaceutical industry
(see Berndt et al., 1995), and (3) given the ex ante nature of the
imitation decision, our theory better predicts the likelihood of
beating the innovator in sales rather than by what magnitude.
and the likelihood of beating the innovator. The
theoretical basis lies in the amount of informa-
tion on the innovator’s drug that is available
to imitators. In the early stages, with relatively
sparse information on the innovator’s develop-
ment program, any imitation efforts will yield
only horizontal differentiation. Over time, how-
ever, as greater information about the innovator
drug leaks out the potential for vertical differ-
entiation increases, giving the imitator significant
advantages over the innovator. In other words, our
principal answer to the question of why the inno-
vator’s advantage in the branded drug industry is
not always durable is that competition within a
new product category in the branded drug indus-
try shifts over time from horizontal differentia-
tion to vertical differentiation. Whereas horizon-
tal differentiation does little to threaten the inno-
vator’s advantage, vertical differentiation benefits
the imitator. We developed several hypotheses to
explore this intuition. All the hypotheses were sup-
ported.
Our results offer three important takeaways for
understanding industry structure, the dynamics of
innovator-imitator competition, and the literature
on entry timing respectively. First, much of the
entry timing literature assumed that products are
either horizontally or vertically differentiated and
examined the effects of entry timing on the imita-
tor’s performance. This approach assumes that the
nature of product differentiation is exogenous to
the entry decisions of firms. We argue and show
that imitative entry decisions are conditioned on
the amount and quality of information available
about the innovator’s product. This information
shapes choices about product differentiation for the
imitators and thus affects the outcome of whether
product categories are horizontally or vertically
differentiated. We outline a theory of imitative
entry that endogenizes the nature of product dif-
ferentiation and shows how the same product can
transition from horizontal to vertical differentiation
over time.
A related issue of industry structure is whether
firms specialize as innovators or imitators? Is there
any evidence for specialization that would suggest
such choices may be endogenous to firm capabili-
ties? Within the branded drug industry, the answer
is an unequivocal no to the question of specializa-
tion. Innovators and imitators often switch roles
across drug product categories. That we find no
evidence for specialization is not surprising. For
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imitators to be able to use the information leaked
from the innovator they need the requisite absorp-
tive capacity (Cohen and Levinthal, 1990) that is
built up over several years of cumulative invest-
ments. For instance, upon observing an innovator
filing a patent on a compound, only those imi-
tators that have built up large banks of molecules
can generate a variant of the innovator’s molecule.
Without the ability to generate such variants, the
innovator’s patent can be a strong entry barrier.
We sought to measure differences in capabilities
using the firm’s cumulative record of patents and
publications. But we did not find statistical support
for the measures, likely because of measurement
error.
Second, with respect to the dynamics of
innovator-imitator competition, much of the the-
oretical and empirical literature on entry timing
has examined industries and/or products that are
characterized by either horizontal or vertical dif-
ferentiation respectively. We are not aware of any
studies that examine industry transitions from hor-
izontal to vertical differentiation or vice versa and
how it affects early entry advantages. This study
showed that such transitions have important impli-
cations for the advantage of the innovator. Turning
this result into a prescriptive lesson, it appears that
one way for imitators to overcome the advantage of
the innovator in horizontally differentiated product
categories is to attempt to transform them into ver-
tically differentiated ones. In other words, imitators
might benefit from shifting the consumers’ focus
on variety or attribute differences (i.e., horizontal
differentiation) to a focus on quality or perfor-
mance differences (i.e., vertical differentiation). It
appears that vertically differentiating a product is
an important lever for imitators to alter the advan-
tage of the innovator and turn it into a pioneering
cost.
Third, there is the question of what our study
offers to the well-established empirical literature
on entry timing. We believe that our study both
embraces and extends it. In embracing it, we do
find support, albeit weak, for the negative relation-
ship between order of entry and the likelihood of
beating the innovator (a proxy for market share).
This is because with increasing entry into a product
category, there is fragmentation of total revenues
that decreases the chances that later movers will
dislodge the innovator. We extend the literature by
showing that timing of imitation does make a cru-
cial difference to the success of imitation efforts.
That said, timing is itself an explanation that is
disembodied from managerial actions and strate-
gies. We show that the effects of entry timing are
simply an artifact of important managerial actions
that create or undermine timing advantages. More
generally, such timing differences embody uncer-
tainties inherent in imitation efforts that in turn
affect the cost versus benefit of imitation. In this
article, we show that one such uncertainty is
the nature of differentiation that is achievable by
the imitator. Thus, our important contribution to
the literature on entry timing is in uncovering
some important firm strategies that underpin the
relationship between entry timing and competitive
(dis)advantage.
Finally, a practical implication of our study is
that imitators will be better off delaying imita-
tion until they obtain useful information about the
innovator’s drug that will enable vertical differ-
entiation. While this will ensure that they will
surpass the innovator in terms of market share,
it is unclear whether this strategy is also profit
maximizing. In other words, is it ever too late
to imitate? Answering this question turns on the
issue of the life cycle of the product category.
If the product category has a finite life and it is
likely to be substituted by another product cate-
gory, then waiting for better information on the
innovator’s drug will be counter-productive from
the standpoint of profit maximization. Even though
the imitator might come up with a vertically dif-
ferentiated product, it may not be profitable if the
entire product category is substituted by a new
one. In contrast, if product categories coexist in
the market (i.e., they are complements) then wait-
ing to get information to develop a higher-quality
drug will also be profit maximizing for the imitator
since the drug category does not have a finite life
cycle. The life cycle of a drug within a product
category is simply a function of remaining patent
life before generics enter the market. Moreover, if
there are generic substitutes for the early entrants,
the importance of a higher-quality imitative drug
is amplified.
CONCLUSION
Having concluded the study of entry timing and
imitation in the branded drug industry, it is useful
to address the question of generalizability or the
boundary conditions under which we expect our
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results to hold. We believe that there are at least
two boundary conditions that merit close scrutiny.
First, the branded drug industry is characterized by
long life cycles of development that span 10 years
or more. During this long run up there is grad-
ual leakage of information about the innovator’s
effort that can aid the imitator’s decision calculus.
The thought experiment to consider is whether our
results will hold in products with shorter develop-
ment life cycles. We surmise that life cycles should
have little impact on our results. Even in shorter
life cycle industries if imitators can transform an
industry from horizontal to vertical differentiation,
we expect innovators’ advantages to erode as well.
However, life cycles become important and inter-
esting when we consider the time for the inno-
vator to respond to the imitator’s differentiation
attempts. Whereas in the pharmaceutical industry,
the innovator’s ability to respond quickly is limited
by regulatory constraints, it is not likely to be the
case in products without such regulatory scrutiny.
If we allow for the innovator to respond rapidly
to the differentiation attempts of the imitator, we
expect a weakening of our results especially if the
capabilities of the innovator and the imitator are
largely similar.
A second boundary condition that is important
is the cost of imitation. In the branded drug indus-
try, a significant proportion of development cost
is already sunk by potential imitators, that is, all
the big pharmaceutical firms own large banks of
molecules that they can draw upon to quickly
commence rival drug programs. For instance, this
explains why two imitator drugs—Cialis and Levi-
tra—were able to enter the market so quickly after
the launch of Viagra. When a significant cost of
imitation is already sunk, the incentives for imi-
tation are significantly higher, especially if the
incremental cost of imitation is a small proportion
of the total cost (Mansfield, Schwartz, and Wagner,
1981). Similarly, to the extent that marketing costs
are already sunk in the form of large, underutilized
sales forces, the incentive to imitate is amplified.
Thus, we believe that to the extent imitation costs
are not sunk, our results are likely to be weakened
since firms may wait considerably longer for the
uncertainty to resolve before they commence imi-
tation. This would extend the early entry advantage
of the innovator.
Finally, our study, like all other empirical stud-
ies, is not without its limitations. We think three
limitations are significant. First, the idea of verti-
cal differentiation being possible after the leakage
of information about phase II clinical trials of the
innovator could not be directly tested. The results
fit well with the industry average of seven years
reported in prior research (DiMasi, 2001a). Ideally
we would have liked to collect the actual phase
II clinical trial completion dates for the innova-
tor. Unfortunately, we were unable to find reliable
information on this, especially for the older drugs.
Second, we measured horizontal and vertical dif-
ferentiation as a count of the indications and side
effects. It is possible that there is a vertical dimen-
sion within each indication. For instance, one drug
might act more quickly than another. Such dif-
ferences are not captured in our measures and
thus classified as horizontal differentiation. This
means that our measure of vertical differentia-
tion is conservative, which perhaps strengthens the
confidence in our results. Finally, our regressions
estimate the likelihood of beating the innovator in
sales. This parallels the problem of demand esti-
mation, which requires simultaneous consideration
of prices and quantities. For a variety of reasons
outlined earlier, we could not control for the effect
of prices. In addition, it is possible that prices (of
the imitator drug and the response of the innova-
tor) may be systematically related to horizontal or
vertical differentiation of the imitator drug. While
this is a clear limitation, it is also common to most
other studies of entry timing effects. We hope that
future research can address these three limitations.
In conclusion, notwithstanding the peculiarities
of the branded drug industry, we believe that our
theory of imitative entry is fairly general. If the
boundary conditions outlined above are met, we
expect the conclusions to carry over into other
industries and products as well. Nevertheless, a
systematic empirical test of our theory in other
products and industries will be a useful extension.
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APPENDIX: DRUG DEVELOPMENT IN
THE BRANDED DRUG INDUSTRY10
The process of drug discovery involves the identi-
fication and validation of candidates or targets for
disease, and the design, synthesis, screening, and
validation of molecules or drug leads that will act
on the targets. A drug target is a protein, cell, or
human organ that is affected by or is a cause of
disease. A single disease may be caused by multi-
ple targets, implying that there are often multiple
approaches to disease treatment.11 The discovery
of a new target (termed new mechanism of action)
and a corresponding drug that acts on the target
signals the emergence of a new product category
for a particular disease treatment. The successful
identification of a drug target and the design of
a molecule that acts on the target concludes the
drug discovery process. The drug discovery pro-
cess is estimated to span an average of about four
years (Banerjee et al., 2001) and consumes about
27 percent of total R&D budget in the branded
drug industry (Mathieu, 2001) or about $10 billion
in 2001. The drug discovery process culminates
with the synthesis of a drug molecule and the fil-
ing of a patent with the United States Patent and
Trademark Office.
The process of drug development begins with
the testing of the new molecule or drug on ani-
mals. Once the safety and efficacy of the drug is
established in animal trials, the firm applies to the
FDA (called an investigational new drug applica-
tion or INDA) for permission to start human trials.
Human clinical trials evolve through three sequen-
tial phases. Phase I trials involve demonstrating
safety in human use, yielding preliminary data on
drug side effects. The success rate of phase I tri-
als is about 22 percent (DiMasi, 2001b). Phase II
trials test for drug efficacy in disease treatment in
addition to assessing side effects. In phase II trials,
10This section draws extensively from an FDA publication
(CDER, 2006).
11 For instance, there are four different targets for AIDS treat-
ment. Entry inhibitors prevent the Human Immunodeficiency
Virus (HIV) from entering cells. Protease inhibitors inhibit pro-
tease activity since protease is involved in the replication of HIV
within T-cells. Both Nucleoside reverse transcriptase inhibitors
(NRTIs) and Non-nucleoside reverse transcriptase inhibitors
(NNRTIs) prevent healthy T-cells in the human body from
becoming infected. Whereas NRTIs work by delivering faulty
nucleotide building blocks that inhibit the HIV genetic material
from replicating, NNRTIs work by attaching themselves to the
reverse transcriptase protein and inhibiting HIV replication.
firms define explicit markers for disease treatment
called indications and look for improvement in
them. For instance, Lipitor, a widely prescribed
drug for cholesterol treatment, lists three indica-
tions: reduction in total cholesterol, LDL choles-
terol, and triglyceride levels respectively. These
indications have to be measurable. The demonstra-
tion of drug efficacy involves showing improve-
ment over a placebo. The conclusion of phase
II clinical trials yields fairly reliable information
on both efficacy (i.e., indications that the drug
treats) and safety (i.e., side effects associated with
the drug). About 32 percent of all drugs enter-
ing phase II trials eventually move on to phase
III (DiMasi, 2001b). Finally, phase III clinical tri-
als involve demonstration of safety and efficacy in
long-term use. The success rate for phase III trials
is about 78 percent (DiMasi, 2001b). This suggests
that a significant proportion of the uncertainty sur-
rounding new drug development is resolved with
the successful conclusion of phase II clinical tri-
als. The human trials process usually spans about
7–12 years and consumes about 38 percent of total
R&D budgets.
Upon successful completion of the human tri-
als, firms submit the clinical trial data to the FDA
and seek approval for marketing the drug. After
FDA review and approval, which typically takes
about two years, the drug is launched in the mar-
ket. Between the filing of the patent after synthesis
of the molecule and final FDA approval (typically
about 8–13 years), there is gradual leakage of drug
efficacy and safety information for the innovator’s
drug. The leakage of information occurs via three
different sources: (1) the filing of patents reveals
the composition of the drug; (2) the recruitment
of patients for each stage of clinical trials signals
success in the prior stage; and (3) the publication
of clinical trial research results in scientific jour-
nals, which is considered essential to building up
the evidence for FDA approval especially in the
case of new drug targets. This gradual leakage of
efficacy and safety information on the innovator’s
drug over a decade sets the stage for the dynamics
of innovator-imitator competition in the branded
drug industry. Thus, imitators can choose to initi-
ate product development efforts at any point after
the filing of the innovator’s patent.
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